Employment tests predict job performance because they measure or are correlated with a large set of malleable developed abilities which are causally related to productivity. Our economy currently underrewards the achievements that are measured by these tests. Consequently, economic incentives to study hard in high school are minimal and this absence of incentives has contributed to the low levels of achievement in math and science. The paper concludes with a discussion of ways in which employment tests can strengthen incentives to learn.
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As a result, test use appears to be growing. A 1985 American Society. for
Personnel Administration survey found that 24 percent of the firms responding had increased testing in the past year and another 44 percent were considering an increase in the amount of testing they do.
Greater use of employment tests will have major effects on the economy.
The most obvious effect of testing is the impact on the sorting of workers across jobs and occupations. The literature reviewed in Hunter (1986) and Schmidt (1988) (Schiff et al 1978 , Dumaret 1985 , Duyme 1985 . other studies have shown that school attendance raises scores on these aptitude tests (Lorge 1945; Husen 1951; Department of Labor 1970) and that taking a rigorous college prep curriculum increases the gains on these tests between sophomore and senior years of high school (Bishop 1985; Hotchkiss 1985) . For high school students, high school grades and performance on academic achievement/aptitude tests have essentially no impact on labor market success.
'l'hey have ---no effect on the chances of finding work when one is seeking it during high school, and --no effect on the wage rate of the jobs obtained while in high school. (Hotchkiss, Bishop and Gardner
1982)
As one can see in table 2, for those who do not go to college fu11-time, high school grades and test scores had ---no effect on the wage rate of the jobs obtained immediately after 6.1 Table 2 .
Effect of Academic Achievemenc 0n the Wage Rates of High School Graduates
The table reports the percentage response of the wage rate or earnings to done standard de'Jiat.lonimprovemfmt in a measure of academic dchievement.
For high school seniors a one standard deviation differential on an achievement test is about equal to 3.5 grade level equivalents or 110 points on the Verbal SAT. For GPA, one standard deviation is about .7 when C's = 2.0, B's = 3.0 and A's = 4.0. The magnitude of the earnings payoff to a credential has been shown to have significant effects on the numbers of students entering college and choosing sp~cific majors (Freeman 1971 (Freeman , 1976 classmates, (3) the reward is received immediately, (4) everyone, including those who begin high school with serious academic deficiencies, has an achievable goal which will generate a significant reward and {5} progress toward the goal can be monitored by the student, parents and teacher.
It
is not easy to design a system of signaling and certifying academic achievement which satisfies all of these requirements. Consequently, it will generally be desireable to simultaneously use more than one signal of academic achievement. Let us examine the alternatives.
Diplomas:
The standard high school diploma satisfies requirement 2, 3, 4 and 5 but it fails to satisfy requirement # 1, the most critical requirement of all. Minimum competency tests for receiving a high school diploma are an improvement, for they are an example of an externally imposed standard of achievement.
They are a step in the right direction, especially when they are taken early in high school, and remedial classes are offered after school and during the summer for those who fail on the first try. However, some students arrive in high school so.far behind that setting a high minimum would cause many to give up trying. Cpnsequently, the minimum standard is not set very high and fails to challenge most students. When employers offering the better jobs use achievement tests to select new employees, everyone who wants a good job faces a strong incentive to study, and those not planning to go to college will find the incentive especially strong. The best paying firms will find they can set higher test score cutoffs than low paying firms, so the reward for learning will become continuous.
Whether one begins 9th grade way behind or way ahead, there will be a benefit on the margin to studying hard for it will improve one's job prospects. 
